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Abstract 
In Britain, wild deer are a commons with a complex institutional structure. In 
recent decades, however, a number of social, cultural, economic, and ecological 
factors have fundamentally altered people’s relationships with wild deer, 
introducing new impacts along with new interactions between deer, their 
environment, and an increasing variety of actors. We describe this as the 
“multivalence” of wild deer. Drivers of change include, among other factors, 
mounting interest in the conservation of woodland and other priority habitats, 
agricultural reform, and rising levels of traffic on British roads, all of which 
interact in a complex fashion with wild deer. Deer Management Groups (DMGs) 
have existed in Britain for many years, in a variety of forms and with diverse 
memberships. They are primarily a response to the mobility of deer, which causes 
the animals to cross jurisdictions and boundaries, thus demanding interaction 
between neighbors, particularly landowners and their deer managers. Drawing 
upon evidence gathered through case-study research, this paper investigates how 
established institutional arrangements in DMGs are reacting to the increasing 
multivalence attributed to this common pool resource. 
Key words: multivalence, institutional adaptation, wild deer management, Deer 
Management Group, Britain 
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Introduction 
This paper illustrates ways in which Deer Management Groups (DMGs), 
as communities of managers, can work as effective institutions for developing 
adaptive resource management rules. DMGs are voluntary associations of actors 
with interests in deer management at a local scale and commonly consist of 
landowners, gamekeepers, and other interested parties from across government, 
private, and “third” sectors. The evidence presented shows that the operation of 
communication and collaboration as institutions forces us to understand 
adaptation in terms of social interaction, knowledge exchange, and consequent 
cultural change. In this framework, adaptation means not only working toward a 
common objective but also finding ways of collaborating between diversity of 
objectives and of cultural legacies (e.g., Tsing 2005). 
In this paper, we follow Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern (2003) in regarding 
institutions as “ways of organizing activities.” Hence, the DMG as a forum for 
meeting and discussion is an institution because it allows and enhances 
communication and collaboration, two fundamental practices for bridging 
diversity, organizing and acting on issues related to the management of natural 
resources. [?] 
The paper draws substantially upon primary research conducted in four 
case-study locations in Scotland and England. The authors conducted semi-
structured interviews, participant observation, and other meetings with 
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stakeholders engaged in the management of wild deer across these case-study 
areas. Using this primary data, along with additional secondary evidence, we 
discuss institutional adaptation in response to the increasing multivalence of deer. 
The concept of multivalence refers to the property of having multiple meanings, 
values, or interpretations. It stems from the complex sociocultural, economic, and 
ecological factors that shape interpretations and meanings attributed to the 
position of deer in the contemporary British environment and have a conditioning 
effect on its management and how it is regulated. These forces of change include, 
among other factors, mounting interest in the conservation of woodland and other 
priority habitats, agricultural reform, and rising levels of traffic on British roads, 
all of which interact in a complex fashion with wild deer. The broadening of 
interests and management objectives associated with wild deer multivalence 
results in a similar broadening of the actors involved in deer management. Newly 
emergent stakeholders seek to engage with, influence, and/or bypass existing 
institutions. DMGs represent forums in which this diversity of actors interact and 
at times define the boundaries of legitimate engagement with this resource. Our 
research sought to engage a sample of respondents encompassing the breadth of 
stakeholders active in DMGs. 
In the following section, we discuss the theoretical context and elements 
that make deer an unusual common pool resource and an “anomalous” species 
(see below). In our second section, we will describe the data and methods 
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employed in this study. This section is followed by a description of the range of 
different values, objectives, and meanings relating to deer in contemporary Britain 
– that is, their multivalence. Following this, we provide a brief overview of 
Britain’s institutions for deer management. This will all supply the context for the 
final section which consists of an in-depth discussion of case-study DMGs and 
how they are adapting to change. We conclude by considering the role DMGs 
may have in the future of deer management and by discussing communication and 
collaboration as core institutions for adaptive governance of natural resources. 
Theoretical Context: Deer as an Unusual Common Property Resource 
The mobility of deer and the costs involved with their confinement make 
these species a good candidate for becoming a common pool resource. In Europe 
and North America, deer are often managed as a common property (e.g., see 
Wagner et al. 2007). In Britain, wild deer can be considered a type of common 
property in the sense that no single actor can claim ownership over them, and only 
after they die or are captured do they become subject to legal entitlements (DCS 
2000; Parkes and Thornley 2000).1 This does not, however, mean that in Britain 
anybody can take or kill a wild deer; they are not an “open access” resource as 
they have been well-regulated. Over several hundred years, a criticized but 
broadly accepted institutional structure – founded largely upon private land-
ownership and associated hunting rights – has evolved to govern access. Indeed, 
in Britain, wild deer are a rather unusual common as they, like all wild animals, 
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are formally res nullius (that is they cannot be owned by anyone while alive) but 
“excludable.” Additionally, depending on the context, they may sometimes be 
“rival” and sometimes “non-rival” (i.e., resource use by one user can sometimes 
reduce the available resource for others). In other cases, deer are unusual as a 
common property resource because over-consumption of the resource is not 
necessarily negative for all stakeholders (e.g., foresters). The complexity of deer 
as a common is also increased by the fact that the multivalence of deer and their 
“anomalous” status (see section below) adds a cultural and spatial dimension to 
the choices driving their management. 
As several scholars have noted, the normal basis for the exclusion of 
potential users from a resource is the allocation of private property rights and, 
consequently, resources that cannot be reduced to private property are usually 
non-excludable (see Vogler 1995). In the case of wild deer in Britain, exclusion is 
guaranteed by rules that restrict the processes and methods by which the resource 
is consumed. A conceptual parallel might be drawn with, for example, the 
exclusion of potential resource users from high-seas fisheries (another res nullius 
resource) via the monopolization of necessary technologies required for their 
exploitation. Today, deer are abundant across much of Britain: they are expanding 
both in population size (reaching numbers close to those of Mesolithic times) and 
range (Ward 2005). The concern that surrounds this population expansion is a 
reflection of the complex nature of British wild deer as a “resource.” 
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Human institutions are “ways of organizing activities” (Dietz, Ostrom, and 
Stern 2003) and encompass the formal and informal rules adopted to regulate use 
of resources (Dietz et al. 2002, cited in Tucker and Ostrom 2005). Dietz, Ostrom, 
and Stern (2003) identified five elements that facilitate the achievement of 
effective commons governance, which for Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern (2003) 
consists of preventing degradation of the resources by human population, 
consumption levels, and the use of advanced technologies: (1) monitoring of 
resources and uses; (2) moderate change in the resource, its use and surrounding 
economic and social conditions; (3) face-to-face communication and networks; 
(4) exclusion of outsiders; and (5) users’ support for the rules in use. In the 
adaptive governance of social-ecological systems and recent co-management 
literature, scholars have identified in what they call “bridging organizations” an 
arena for building needed elements of adaptive governance and co-management; 
i.e., “knowledge production, trust building, sense making, learning, vertical and 
horizontal collaboration, and conflict resolution” (Berkes 2009:1695; see also 
Folke et al. 2005; Hahn et al. 2006; Olsson et al. 2007; Olsson, Folke, and Hughes 
2008). Here, we focus on the DMG, a “bridging organization” as a “community of 
managers,” to shed light on the social process behind the development of those 
elements needed to respond to changes in management needs and objectives.  
This study also identifies the fundamental elements needed to overcome the 
diversity of objectives (cultural, economic, political, etc.) that characterize the 
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members of these communities that come together to respond to changing 
management needs. 
Deer management in Britain reflects the rules for effective common 
property governance. Deer numbers and use are in many cases monitored, and 
deer numbers are moderately changing in terms of their impacts or in terms of the 
abundance of deer for hunting (note that in the British islands, hunting deer is 
referred to as “stalking”).  Generally speaking, deer are increasing in numbers and 
distribution. Various forums facilitate face-to-face communication and the 
development of networks between managers and policymakers and at various 
scales. Outsiders tend to be excluded from management decisions and from the 
resource. Finally, our research indicates that there is overall support from 
established stakeholders for the rules in use, which is often expressed in resistance 
to changes in the system. However, this situation is challenged by the increasing 
multivalence of wild deer that is now (as many actors see it) requiring an 
adjustment of the institutions and rules applied to their management. The capacity 
to adapt governance to more complex systems has been linked in the literature to 
the capacity of the system to provide information, deal with conflict, promote 
compliance with rules, and prepare for change (Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003; 
see also Folke et al. 2005). 
In the case of wild deer in Britain, the adaptation required, in the face of 
increasing multivalence, by the institutional and governance system cannot be 
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exclusively informed by a wholly materialistic understanding of deer and the 
environment. Instead, it must account for tangible and intangible sociocultural, 
historical, and political processes, which affect the meanings and values attributed 
to deer and the way change can take place (the “Attributes of the Community,” as 
Ostrom (2005) defines them). In other words, institutional adaptation involves 
individuals’ cultural legacies embedded in emotions and feelings for the deer. 
This connection derives from the link existing between values and meanings, and 
the fact that meanings connect to feelings because they are known through the 
emotions that they induce (Milton 2002). Institutions are also the result of 
historical and political processes being “the product of contested social practices 
that are culturally and historically embedded” (Scoones 1999:494; see also Leach, 
Mearns, and Scoones 1999; Mosse 1997). These processes can be a constraint and 
impact upon possible future institutional arrangements.  
Data and Methods 
In this work, we combine secondary and primary data to describe the 
historical, social, and cultural contexts that affected the ways in which the 
management of deer in Britain is organized. Hence, our discussion will not follow 
the canonical separation between data and results but will combine secondary 
information and their discussion with primary data and its analysis. 
Secondary information was derived from grey literature, e.g., 
governmental and non-governmental organizations’ (NGO) reports, minutes of 
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meetings, texts of legislative acts, historical accounts, and publications. Primary 
information derived from our own fieldwork that took place between Winter 2006 
and Winter 2009 in England and Scotland. Data collection was based on semi-
structured interviews (usually recorded and transcribed verbatim), participant 
observation, and structured meetings involving the widest variety of actors with a 
stake in deer management, e.g., representatives of governmental agencies, NGOs, 
as well as local landowners and gamekeepers. 
Fieldwork followed a nested approach that connected deer management as 
it is discussed, addressed, and conceived at the national level and at the local 
level. Two sets of interviews covered these dimensions. At the national level, 
interviews (a total of 22, to be discussed below) were conducted with national 
representatives of government agencies, NGOs related with hunting or 
conservation, and commercial enterprises at the national level. At the local level, 
we adopted a case study approach. Four case studies (four DMGs), two in 
England and two in Scotland, were selected to guarantee the broader diversity of 
management objectives and recent changes in such objectives, consequently 
allowing the collection of information in “hot spots”; i.e., areas in which conflicts 
of management interests were more likely to require institutional adaptation. 
Interaction involved a broad variety of actors including landowners, land 
managers (i.e., gamekeepers, farmers), government representatives, NGO 
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representatives, and members of the local community (e.g., city council, police, 
etc.). 
In Scotland, the case studies were located in Perthshire and Sutherland. 
Nine interviewees in each location asked questions on issues and level of 
collaboration over deer management; while 12 and 11 interviews, respectively, 
covered topics related to objectives, rules, and practices guiding deer 
management. Further information was collected in informal conversations with 
local residents and during business meetings held by the two DMGs and promoted 
by the research team, for a total of six meetings. In England, the case studies were 
located in South Dorset and the Welsh “Marches” (Herefordshire and South 
Shropshire). In these locations, a total of three and five audio recorded interviews 
were conducted and a series of meetings and less structured interviews were 
collected for a total of 15 data points for each case study. Interviews and 
secondary information, e.g., minutes of meetings, were coded for themes and 
topics using the qualitative data analysis software NVivo 8.  
The “Multivalence” and “Anomalous Status” of Wild Deer in Contemporary 
Britain 
The relationships and interactions between humans and wild deer are 
many and varied, being affected by the uses that people make of deer and the 
value and meanings they attribute to this animal. We argue here that this 
“multivalence” has increasingly influenced the process of institutional adaptation 
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of deer management in recent decades.  Hence, institutions have had to move 
from regulating deer as a resource for food and hunting, to the incorporation of 
their impact upon agriculture and forestry, to account for the linkages this 
resource has to various economic activities and social, cultural, and ecological 
processes.  Among others, these include mobility and transport, national identity, 
and nature conservation. 
In some rural areas of Britain, wild deer remain a resource of substantial 
economic value. Deer are valued in relation to the opportunities they afford for 
satisfying the demands of visiting “sportsmen,” and this is considered to be 
largely dependent on the abundance and quality of the resource. Reports 
commissioned by various interest groups (see Kerr 2004; Langbein and Putman 
2006; PACEC 2006; SAOS 2004; TNS 2004) have highlighted the importance of 
sporting activity as compared with venison, which remains a byproduct of the 
former.  Although an important resource for some, deer hunting in England is 
neither as prominent nor as widespread an activity as in Scotland.  Instead, game 
bird shooting is more important economically and agriculture constitutes the 
dominant rural land-use. The above studies also highlighted the negative 
economic impact of deer on some other forms of land use, such as production 
forestry, agriculture, and transport. 
In addition to these economic values, wild deer also possess significant 
intangible values. Sporting has a central importance for Scotland’s society, 
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culture, and history. “Red” and “roe” deer, “heather,” “hills,” and “mountains” 
were categories selected by the Scottish public as among those species and 
habitats that are “important for any reasons including for conservation, for their 
own personal enjoyment, as economically important (e.g., fishing), simply their 
favorite, as symbols of Scottish identity or just that they are nice to see” (Stewart 
2006:2). Deer can be a symbol of nobility and control of land throughout Britain. 
They have been viewed as a symbol of foreign exploitation of Scotland’s natural 
resources (McGrath 1974). Today, they often symbolize natural beauty 
(particularly in Scotland within publications such as information booklets for 
tourists) and of rural life more generally. Ecologically, native red and roe deer are 
themselves indicators of Britain’s biodiversity and perform ecosystem functions 
such as the suppression of woody flora on heath and grassland and seed dispersal 
across an increasingly fragmented landscape (Gill and Beardall 2001). This 
increasing multivalence of wild deer has had a profound effect upon the number 
and diversity of actors claiming to have a “stake,” and, thus, wishing to participate 
in deer management. 
Institutions able to regulate the bounded management needs dictated by 
the economic, social, and cultural aspects of multivalence are in place. What is 
not yet clear is how these institutions are able to effectively address multivalence 
in spatial terms and address the “anomalous status” of deer as a wild animal. John 
Knight (2000), building on Mary Douglas’ work (1992, 2002), describes an 
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animal’s “anomalous status” as deriving from a cultural ordering of the world into 
dichotomous classes. Based on this perspective, phenomena are viewed as 
anomalous when they resist such classificatory schemes. One grouping of 
anomalous animals is based on physical cross-boundary; e.g., the whale that blurs 
the line between fish and mammal. A second form of animal anomaly identified 
by this author is spatial: “When space is culturally divided into different spheres, 
each of which carries a distinctive moral evaluation, it can serve as a basic 
classifier of animals” (Knight 2000:14). This process also underpins the 
production of place. Land uses divide the landscape up into more or less discrete 
spaces in which economic, social, and cultural spheres of human life materialize. 
The anomalous status of deer results from the fact that, unless they are fenced in 
or out, deer move across these spaces and interfere with this spatial ordering. 
The impossibility of maintaining the boundaries of this spatial ordering 
due to the mobility of deer results in human social conflicts with and over deer. 
Conflicts related to damage caused by deer, as well as conflicts that emerge from 
people holding different interests and attributing different meanings to deer give 
rise to social divisions and social aggregations (Knight 2000 following Douglas 
1992). This is a sociocultural process that, as we have discussed above, involves 
not just discussions over different uses that are made of deer (or of a resource); 
this process involves exchanges that are intimate to the actors involved, being 
linked to emotions, meanings, and values that emerge as actors relate and 
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experience their society, culture, and environment (Milton 2002).  Institutional 
responses to deer mobility and multivalence can, thus, develop only where social 
contact and exchange is possible. We argue that, in this case study, DMGs have 
the potential for facilitating such contacts and exchanges. 
Institutions for Deer Management in Britain 
Formal deer legislation in Britain goes back to 1016 (Charta de Foresta), 
and through time it has evolved to accommodate new economic and land use 
interests. At the same time, it has impacted significantly upon deer management 
practice and objectives (see Whitehead 1980). 
Deer management in Scotland is currently regulated by the Deer 
(Scotland) Act of 1996 that established the Deer Commission for Scotland (DCS). 
The DCS has duties to “further the conservation, control, and sustainable 
management of deer in Scotland, and keep under review all matters, including 
their welfare, relating to deer” (Deer (Scotland) Act 1996, Part 1, Paragraph 1, 
section a). The organization embraces diverse objectives concerning deer 
management through the inclusion of a range of expertise, interest groups and 
organizations’ representatives as commissioners, and consulting on matters of 
priority with groups of organizations, such as through their Deer Management 
Round Table discussion forum. Since August 1st 2010, following the Public 
Service Reform (Scotland) Act 2010, DCS merged with the Scottish Natural 
Heritage (SNH). DSC’s powers and functions and most of its staff, along with 
17 
 
DCS’s 2008 vision for managing wild deer has been now transferred to SNH (see 
SNH 2010). In the discussion that follows we kept reference to DCS for 
consistency. 
In England, legislation has not created a government body equivalent to 
DCS with statutory powers relating to deer and their management. Some 
organizations with explicit interests in deer management meet under the auspices 
of the Deer Initiative (DI), first established in 1995, with the objective to “ensure 
the delivery of a sustainable, well managed wild deer population in England.” Our 
research has revealed that in its initial incarnation, the DI was heavily criticized as 
it was perceived to be little more than a “stalking club” (i.e., a “hunting club”). 
However, it has been revitalized in the last five years or so and is now widely 
perceived to contribute substantially toward sustainable deer management. 
Although it is funded almost exclusively by government, and this brings with it 
certain governmental objectives, the DI is not a government agency, and our 
research reveals that its staff, being aware of perceived governmental 
“interference” in private land management, are keen to maintain their autonomy. 
It is a “partnership” of stakeholder organizations (both state and non-state) 
charged with achieving its objectives specifically through the development of 
collaborative management, particularly through the establishment and support of 
deer management groups (see the Initiative’s “Deer Accord”) (DI not dated). 
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Both the DI and the DCS have an important advisory role for the deer 
sector, collecting and sharing information related and relevant to deer 
management. In the past, the DCS was responsible for counting deer throughout 
Scotland on a rotating basis. It now collects estates’ cull numbers and, as the DI in 
England, is responsible for the collation and development of Best Practice 
guidelines. 
In some instances, legislation can very closely define deer management 
objectives and practice. In a few cases, the DCS have intervened directly in 
culling deer that were causing environmental damage, although these 
interventions have severely affected its image and reputation. An emergency 
intervention that occurred in Glenfeshie, north-east Scotland in 2004 was heavily 
criticized by organizations in the sector, attracted attention from national press 
media and resulted in a ministerial inquiry (see ERAD 2004). In England, the 
Deer Initiative has no such powers and, being aware of its voluntary status and the 
impact of these forced interventions in Scotland, expresses no interest in obtaining 
them. 
Direct external intervention in the management of deer by a public body 
on private property represents a substantial break with the perceived fundamental 
rights of landowners which, as noted, form the basis and unit of deer management 
in Britain. In order to address potential conflicts arising from the effects that the 
management of one land holding can have for another, the concept of deer 
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management groups has been promoted and developed in both Scotland and 
England. A DMG aims ideally to be a forum at which land holdings that together 
encompass the range of a single population or herd of deer are represented and 
discuss management policies to meet the requirements of all the members 
(ADMG 2008). Originally established in a context in which land holdings were 
mainly managed to respond to sporting interests, the composition of 
contemporary DMGs is beginning to include interests reflecting the current 
multivalence of wild deer. 
The following section will provide an overview of the DMG as a 
management entity and discuss its potential as a forum for communication and 
institutional development despite its apparent lack of influence over the 
management of single areas. 
Deer Management Groups, Collaboration, and Institutional Change  
In the 1980s, the Red Deer Commission (the precursor of the DCS) was 
instrumental in setting up a network of voluntary deer management groups in 
Scotland to bring interested parties together to facilitate discussion and coordinate 
management. While DMGs existed as early as 1968 and other forms of 
collaborative management were in place on Scottish islands prior to that date 
(Finnie 2004), the number of DMGs grew from a total of 10 in 1979 to about 45 
in 2001 (Nolan, Hewison, and Maxwell 2001). Today there are more than 70 
DMGs in Scotland, including groups and subgroups (ADMG 2008). DMGs have 
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existed in England for some time also with one functioning group in our study 
area having been formed nearly 35 years ago. However, the DI has sought to 
foster the expansion of their number in the decade since its establishment and 
particularly in the last five years. This organization is not, however, allocated 
resources equal to those of the DCS in order to achieve this mission. 
DMGs are voluntary, the majority do not seek statutory powers and would 
welcome public support for information-gathering on habitat conditions, 
monitoring of deer numbers and habitats as well as the provision of technical 
advice in the form of Deer Management Plans (Nolan, Hewison, and Maxwell 
2001). Nolan, Hewison, and Maxwell (2001) also found that DMG membership in 
Scotland was quite engaged, with more than half the membership being active in 
the typical group’s activities. Groups tend to have about two general meetings 
every year in which information relevant to the sector is shared or reported by 
representatives of relevant organizations, including for example the DCS and 
Association of Deer Management Groups (ADMG). Cull numbers, deer counts, 
and other management methods are also discussed. During these meetings, 
minutes are usually taken, although in substantially differing levels of detail, and 
distributed before the following meeting. Meetings are attended for the majority 
by gamekeepers and landowners, followed by managers or factors and by 
government or community representatives and representatives of other land-use 
interests, e.g., DCS, ADMG, SNH (Nolan, Hewison, and Maxwell 2001). 
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Although no similar survey has been conducted in England, our research indicates 
that the constitution and operation of DMGs in England is similar to that in 
Scotland. Most groups aim to meet at regular intervals, often at strategically key 
points in the deer and general land-management calendar. These meetings form 
opportunities for communication about deer ecology and movement in the DMGs 
area, management methods, and the legalities of hunting (and any changes 
therein). Groups vary considerably in levels of formality and recording. Some are 
accompanied by full minute-taking while others can be described simply as 
informal but focused conversations – essentially social occasions. Some 
successful groups draw on established and accepted social structures, for example 
being chaired by a senior local landowner. There is often a high ratio of 
representation by private professional hunters responsible for one or more parcels 
of land rather than the actual land-owning party. This is considered problematic 
by some and is perceived to be due to lack of time and expertise on the part of 
most landowners, especially those with smaller holdings. While the group’s own 
legal status is a common interest and subject of conversation within these groups, 
it is clear that there would be little appetite for greater regulation of deer 
management. Groups commonly feature a representative from the DI, and 
sometimes from other external agencies such as the local police or Natural 
England, and English equivalent of SNH, a public body for the conservation and 
enhancement of the natural environment. Land-owning governmental actors such 
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as the Forestry Commission and local councils are often more directly involved 
and are a significant source of advice for other DMG members. There is some 
NGO representation within DMGs in England, featuring organizations such as the 
National Trust and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB), but our 
study has revealed participation neither by local community members (other than 
those already engaged with deer) nor by recreational organizations or interests. 
What follows highlights those elements of the social interaction within 
DMGs that contribute to an understanding of the process of adaptation of 
governance and of institution in response to increase deer multivalence. 
Figure 1 illustrates the location and diversity of estates in one of the 
Scottish case study areas. The DMG responsible for the area was set up by the 
DCS and has been active since 1988. The area it manages is quite fragmented in 
terms of size of land holdings and interests in relation to deer. This is generally 
considered to make the interactions between management and members more 
difficult because it is more likely that interference occurs across management 
units. The Chairman pointed this out clearly during an interview: 
I mean as I said it was always going to be a problem area because of all of 
the disputes and land use interests. You know it’s not like it’s one of these 
areas where you can take about 100,000 acres and you have got four 
different estates all with the same interests. It’s not like that at all. 
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This notion of shared interests as the basis for successful collaboration was 
reconfirmed by the Chair of a DMG in England who noted that one significant 
reason that their group had operated so successfully for such a long period of time 
was the coherence and similarity of interests shared across all the participants and, 
specifically, as noted above, the absence of contrasting sporting interests in the 
area. 
In addition to the complication introduced by the diversity of land use 
interests, we might expect DMGs to be impaired by their voluntary nature, 
affecting their ability to generate binding and enforceable agreements, to impose 
sanctions, or exercise social pressure. In the words of the chairman of one such 
group: “Basically it’s purely a voluntary thing; you can’t make anybody do 
anything that they don’t want to do, so it’s really about talking to each other….” 
However, talking to each other is among the key assets of DMGs. It 
provides a mean for sharing knowledge, for mutual learning and finding out the 
values and ideas of other stakeholders in the area, and, crucially, contributes to the 
building of trust. A lack of trust between actors has been identified as the crucial 
factor behind the occurrence of Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” and similar 
constructs based on the “prisoner’s dilemma” (e.g., Vogler 1995). Trust has been 
shown to be important for achieving near optimal results in experimental settings 
(Ostrom 1998, 2005). Therefore, the development of opportunities for sharing 
knowledge, values, and development of trust can be considered fundamental for a 
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community of stakeholders that is brought together to manage a commons, in 
order to overcome its divisions and develop ways to accept and mediate diverse 
values and potential contrasting objectives. 
Attendance at meetings is a fundamental step for building the stakeholding 
community and, as long as new attendees are from within sectors perceived as 
holding a legitimate “stake,” is usually positively welcomed by the existing DMG 
members. At a recent meeting in one of the study areas covered by this project, 
the first action by the Chairman was to welcome into the group a couple who had 
recently purchased an estate in the area and the representative of another estate 
who was attending the group meeting for the first time. Without attendance and 
inclusiveness, the DMG would lose its capacity to adapt deer management to 
change: 
It was years before we started getting anybody to come along…[the 
DMG] wasn’t real until Glen X was sold and things started to change. 
There was a period when the things got badly disbanded and it had much 
to do with the Deer Commission. The land of Glen X was sold to the 
[NGO] and there were massive plans of culling deer, etc., etc., and the 
Deer Commission started holding meetings, but it didn’t involve the Deer 
Management Group. So basically we put our foot down and said: you set it 
up. So what’s the point of setting it up if that’s the way you are going to 
handle things, you see. And I think after that we got back on track again. 
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In practice, things improved for this DMG. In fact, attendance is now near 
100 percent, up from 50 percent of the time before Glen X’s acquisition, and 
representatives of the non-governmental organizations that manage land in the 
area and of the Forestry Commission (FC), a government agency charged with the 
management of public forests in the United Kingdom, attend meetings and openly 
discuss management issues. The continuity of the dialogue between actors within 
the DMG contributes to the clarification of the multivalence represented in the 
group, i.e., the array of values and motivations underlying deer management 
decisions. It also clarifies the knowledge base for decisions and identifies areas in 
which work can be done to reduce management conflicts. 
Interaction in the DMG not only provides more information and clarifies 
each actor’s position and practices, but also opportunities for communication are 
used to scope the boundaries and constraints of opposing factions further 
enriching the understanding of the different “other.” This knowledge can become 
an advantage in the process of mediation of change. In the quote that follows, the 
chairman of a DMG expresses this eloquently, reflecting on the development of 
relationships between sporting estates and NGOs and government agencies in the 
DMG area: 
 Interviewer: So, how is the relationship with the NGO right now? 
Chairman: Their relationship with everybody is quite good. 
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Interviewer: Have you found an agreement similar to the one you have 
with FC? 
Chairman: Yeah, I wouldn’t say that we have agreements as such, but we 
just try to get people to… 
 Interviewer: Understand the situation… 
Chairman: At the end of the day, FC and the NGO, they are charities and 
government organizations…. We play on that a little bit. They are quite 
susceptible to public opinion. 
For some, communication and sharing of information are often considered 
to be the only outcomes of DMG interaction. In the view of a member of a DMG 
in Scotland (note below that tweed indicates the traditional outfit of a sportsman 
and estates’ gamekeepers as opposed to “waterproofs” being the garment of 
choice of hill walkers and environmental activists): 
Communication and direct sharing of information is practically the only 
form of collaboration provided by the DMG. However, land ownership 
changes have produced rapid transformation in the DMG that has now 
“less tweed and more waterproofs” and more participation. 
As discussed above, DMGs have been established to manage a shared 
population of deer. Now that the complexity of deer multivalence has increased, 
however, DMGs are considered by many as the institutions that can better 
contribute to adapting management to this new complexity. So far the effect of 
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deer multivalence has conditioned deer management in two main ways.  One 
consists of focused actions by governmental organizations to achieve favorable 
habitat conditions in sites at special conservation status (e.g., in Scotland, SNH 
worked alongside DCS to give guidance and monitor Section 7 agreements, a 
form of co-management arrangement defined in the Deer (Scotland) Act 1996, on 
special sites).  The second consists of NGOs and government organizations 
acquiring ownership or deer management rights on parcels of land. In this latter 
case, management right status grants direct control of deer over an area and access 
to the local DMG. 
The case studies followed in this project cover both forms of change. The 
illustrative example that follows describes how change was handled as a 
consequence of new landownership. The Scottish DMG represented in Figure 1 
experienced substantial land ownership change with new NGO and Forestry 
Commission ownership, which provides a very useful example of adaptive 
management. In response to the changes in ownership, the establishment of a deer 
fence was proposed, which would have had the effect of preventing deer moving 
from the sporting estates southwards onto ground now managed for conservation 
that historically had been favored by stags in winter. Discussions, assessment, and 
development of the proposed fence unfolded over nearly three years within the 
DMG, DMG subgroups, and other organizations and actors (for example, the 
National Park Authority, DCS, SNH, Animal Welfare Committees, public 
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meetings, and Members of the Scottish Parliament). The FC held the main 
responsibility for the progress of the proposal and additionally offered expertise 
for the development of a Deer Management Plan. During this period, discussions 
were also held over the need for more information to evaluate the environmental 
and economic impacts and would have provided the basis for deciding who would 
have had to pay the predicted £200,000 ($324,442) installation costs (plus 
£10,000 ($16,222) per year for maintenance) (see Johnson 2004). Even if they 
were willing to contribute in kind, the sporting and farming estates in the DMG 
were not willing to pay money upfront. Eventually, in 2005, the FC withdrew 
from the fence proposal altogether, opting instead for a combination of culling 
and small enclosures, while continuing to work with the DMG. The failure of the 
fence proposal resulted in the developed Deer Management Plan being dropped. 
But, crucially, it did not result in an interruption of communication between 
stakeholders in the DMG. Neither did it interrupt the trust that had been built 
during the process nor escalate conflicts. Instead, the willingness of the FC and 
local NGOs to work with the DMG was explored further. 
DMG meeting minutes clearly illustrate the communication and 
negotiation between parties within which compromise and adaptation were 
achieved and recognized appreciatively. FC representatives agreed to monitor the 
evolving situation and consult with the DMG when and where specific conditions 
were to materialize, although they remained clear that their own objectives would 
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have to be met. This stance was also subsequently adopted by the non-
governmental organizations involved. The consultation agreement reached by the 
group, which requires parties to inform the group and allow 48 hours for the 
group to agree on a course of action where deer cause severe damage to specific 
areas, is a clear example of the development of a rule that deals with potential 
conflicts over deer multivalency and enhances a group’s capacity to respond to 
changes in environmental conditions. The minutes also clearly illustrate how 
discussions are at times played out during meetings with parties wanting the 
opposing side to accept their understanding of the implications of certain actions. 
Changing land ownership also triggered complex new deer multivalence at 
a location in England, actually resulting in the establishment of a DMG to attempt 
to adapt management to the new situation. In this case, a new estate owner erected 
a deer fence (without consultation with other stakeholders) which altered deer 
movement across the local landscape. The nature and location of traffic accidents 
involving deer on the area’s main road changed, shifting to a stretch of road 
where vehicles traveled faster on average, changing in turn impacts on woodland 
flora and even fruit crops. While the new estate owner does not participate in the 
DMG and the fence remains in place, the changes triggered action and cohesion 
among other local landowners, hunters, and government agencies (especially the 
Forestry Commission). The DMG remains in its early stages of development, but 
has already facilitated days of coordinated action among local deer managers. 
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One significant problem introduced to DMGs with the increasing 
multivalence of wild deer is the sheer number of stakeholders in cases where 
either average land holdings are small or attempts are made to manage deer over a 
large area (perhaps including more than one herd). This creates a situation where 
a great many individuals are expected to engage with the DMG and attend its 
meetings. Instead of a group of 10-20 people, in these instances DMGs can reach 
sizes of 40-50 individuals. This occurred in a second DMG encompassed by our 
study. Such large groups make communication between individuals – the basis of 
trust building and learning – very difficult because of the limited time at each 
meeting event, the lack of opportunity for all to be heard during open and group 
discussion, or to interact informally after the meeting at the nearby pub. Our case-
study DMG failed to agree on courses of action on several occasions and several 
members cite the size of the group as one of the primary reasons for this. 
Conclusions 
This discussion of deer management in Britain allows us to open the 
debate on collaboration and communication as institutional forms with the 
potential to facilitate the adaptation of governance of complex systems. The 
workings of DMGs indicate the relevance of collaboration and communication in 
providing information, dealing with conflict, and responding to change (see Dietz, 
Ostrom, and Stern 2003). In fact, both in England and Scotland, we could observe 
increased participation and group cohesion as responses to lack of engagement 
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with the local DMG. The process of institutional adaptation requires the 
acceptance by the parties involved of the fact that there is an issue, or interrelated 
set of issues, that requires the group’s attention. However, it does not require all 
the members of the group to solve the issue by adopting common objectives for 
management linked to a common set of values and meanings for the deer. Rather 
than a reduction of deer multivalence, adaptation needs institutional bridges to be 
built that can create the opportunity to follow different directions and allow 
consensus on the legitimacy of the range of objectives expressed by those who 
hold stakes in the deer. 
This process does not necessarily develop in an orderly and stepwise 
fashion, but it is successful if it is able to maintain an inclusive community of 
managers and interested actors. In order to achieve this, communication is 
fundamental because it allows the group’s members to understand the diversity of 
knowledge and the diversity of meanings and values held for deer. In other words, 
collaboration and communication allow cultural exchanges, leading to the 
development of new understandings that are the basis for subsequent change and 
adaptation. 
Land uses often divide the landscape in more or less discrete spaces in 
which the economic, social, and cultural spheres of human life are carried on. In 
some contexts, deer become anomalous animals because they interfere with the 
ordering established by humans or challenge the possibility of creating such 
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spatial ordering. However, the same humans that divided these spaces can come 
together and reestablish a certain degree of connectivity. This connectivity does 
not reduce the multivalence of deer; instead, it increases the social and cultural 
diversity of an area. 
This article illustrates ways in which DMGs, as communities of managers 
or bridging organizations (e.g., Berkes 2009), can work as institutions effective 
for developing adaptive management rules. They are fertile ground for social 
interaction and cultural production (see West 2006). The evidence presented also 
shows that the operation of communication and collaboration as institutions forces 
us to understand adaptation in terms of cultural change and collaboration, 
meaning not only working toward a common objective but also collaboration 
between diverse objectives and cultural legacies. 
In some situations, informal or semi-formal settings for social interaction 
can fulfill important roles in building trust and create appropriate environment for 
resolving disputes over the management of multivalued natural resources. The 
DMGs in Britain also show us that, at times, we do not need a big solution to the 
tragedy of the commons but lots of little, partial ones. The tragedy can to some 
extent be overcome by small steps rather than by radical change. 
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Notes 
1. The present article focuses on wild deer in Britain. On the mainland of the 
United Kingdom, there are six different species of wild deer: roe (Capreolus 
capreolus) and red (Cervus elaphus) deer are native. Fallow (Dama dama), Sika 
(Cervus nippon), muntjac (Muntiacus reevesi), and Chinese water deer 
(Hydropotes inermis inermis) are non-native species (Putman 1988). 
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